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TENNESSEE JUDICIAL HIGHLIGHTS*
Administratiye Low-Transfer of Incorrigible Minor to State Penitentiary
Harwood v. State ex rel. Pillars, 184 Tenn. 515, 201 S. W. 2d 672 (1947).
In a case of first impression in Tennessee the petitioner, a minor, while
serving a felony sentence in the-State Vocational School, was deemed incor-
rigible and transferred to the State Penitentiary by the State Commissioner
of Institutions. The plaintiff petitioned the court for writ of habeas corpus,
claiming unlawful restraint and alleging as unconstitutional statutory pro-
visions permitting transfer to the State Penitentiary for completion of the
sentence on the ground that such statute has the effect of imprisonment in
the penitentiary without trial by jury and without an indictment.
The opinion by Justice Neil stated that constitutional provisions protect-
ing a citizen against imprisonment without indictment and jury trial are not
applicable to administrative control of penal or other corrective institutions:
and that the act of the State Commissioner ,of Institutions was not a judicial
act but purely an authorized administrative measure.
Agency-Status of Police Officer in Answering Call
O'Quin v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 184 Tenn. 570, 201 S. V. 2d 694
(1947).
The deceased, an epileptic patient in the defendant general hospital, be-
came unruly and dangerous during the night and began to roam the hospital
causing disturbances. The hospital employees called the police who entered
the cellar to restrain the patient and there shot him to death after one of the
policemen had sustained a broken arm in a scuffle with the deceased and the
deceased was advancing upon the other policeman with an upraised piece of
water pipe. The plaintiff sought recovery from the defendant for the negli-
gent death of the deceased alleging that the police were the agents of the de-
fendant hospital.
The court, speaking through Justice Prewitt, held that the police officers
were not the agents of the defenhdant; that such officers act in a governmental
capacity and individuals or corpbrations enlisting their services to prevent
a breach of the peace are not liable for their acts unless engaging with them in
some unlawful plan or act.
* Cases of current interest and importance published between March 1, 1947, and
March 1, 1948.
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Contracts-Effect of Provision Later Declared Unlawful
American Federation of Labor v. Roane-Anderson Co., 206 S. W. 2d 386
(Tenn. 1947).
The plaintiff and defendant entered into a labor contract which pro-
vided, among other things, for a "closed shop." The agreement was signed on
February 17, 1947, and was to become effective on February 24, 1947. On
February 21, the governor approved an act which, in effect, outlawed con-
tracts which provided for a "closed shop." Sec. 4 of the act stated "That the
provisions of this Act shall not apply to any lawful contract in force on the
effective date of this Act. . . ." This suit was instituted by the plaintiff for a
declaratory judgment as to the effect of the statute upon the contract.
Chief Justice Neil, speaking for. the court, stated that "the agreement
between the parties was in force in the sense that it was duly signed on Feb-
ruary 17, 1947. 3ut the closed shop feature of the contract was not to become
operati-e or enforceable until February 24, 1947 ;" and, while parties to a con-
tract may bind themselves to some future transaction, "it is well settled that
contracts are divisible and, if the thing to be done in the future is declared
unlawful, the parties are excused from abiding by its terms."
Contracts-Misreprese-ntation as Basis for Rescission of Contract
Simmons v. Evans, 206 S. W. 2d 295 (Tenn. 1947).
In the course of negotiation for the sale of a house and lot, the defendants
told the complainants that they could use all the water they wanted at the flat
rate of two dollars per month. After purchasing the house and lot and taking
possession, the complainants learned that the water was cut off each night
at seven and not turned on again until seven the next morning. The complain-
ants brought an action to have the sale rescinded alleging fraud by conceal-
ment of a material fact and by a material misrepresentation. The defendants
contended that the fraud alleged was not actionable because "the water stip-
ply was no part of the real estate--they merely contracted to buy a house and
lot."
Justice Tomlinson, in reversing a decree sustaining a demurer to the bill
of complaint, pointed out that while the question had not been presented to
the court before, the situation of this house and lot with reference to the
availability of water was a situation affecting the quality and condition of
the house and lot and that this was a material misrepresentation of particular
facts affecting such quality and conditioh and therefore actionable.
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Evidence-Facts Raising Presumption Against Innocence
Ford v. State, 184 Tenn. 443, 201 S. V. 2d 539 (1945). *
The day following his wife's disappearance, the defendant returned a
.32 caliber pistol to his father. When discovered, the wife was dead and an ex-
amination of her body disclosed a bullet fired from a .32 caliber pistol. After
his arrest and indictment for murder, the defendant sent a note to his father
requesting him to bring in the pistol. The pistol was not produced and the
father offered no testimony at the trial.
The opinion by Chief Justice Chambliss, in summarizing the incriminat-
ing circumstances, states that the failure of the defendant to produce the
weapon or to account therefor by the clearly available testimony of his fa-
ther, was a damaging circumstance raising a presumption against innocence.
Insurance-Cashing of Premium Checks Prior to Policy Approval
Arnold v. Locomotive Engineers Mitutual Life & Accident Ins. Ass'l:., 204
S. W. 2d 191 (Tenn. App. 1946), cert. denied.
The deceased, with knowledge of limitations upon the insurer's agent,
submitted a policy application to the agent together with a check for the first
premium payment and these were transmitted to the defendant's home office
for requisite approval. Before the home office approved the application, having
determined a physical examination was necessary, the deceased met his death.
The defendant cashed the premium check subsequent to the death of the de-
ceased but prior to any knowledge thereof. The plaintiff brought suit as bene-
ficiary.
Judge Hickerson, delivering the opinion of the court, found that the
contract of insurance was conditioned upon approval by the home office and
was not approved prior to the death of the applicant. And further, that the cus-
tomary cashing of premium checks prior to policy approval, and depositing
payments in own bank account to be refunded if application for insurance
is rejected, neither effected a waiver of the defendant's right to claim that no
contract of insurance existed, nor estopped the defendant in any 'way where
the defendant immediately refunded the premium price upon learning of the
deceased's death.
Insurance-Interpretation of Exclusion Clause
Lunn. v. Indiana Luinbernens Mutual Insurance Co., 184 Tenn. 584, 201 S. W.
2d 978 (1947).
The plaintiff had an insurance policy on his car which contained an ex-
• Designated for publication April 24, 1947.
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clusion clause that the policy was not to apply to any damage due and "con-
fined to" mechanical breakdown, unless such damage was the result of a loss
otherwise covered by the, policy. While the plaintiff was driving his car, the
hood became unfastened as the result of a latch breaking and the hood was
blown back causing extensive damage to the car.
The opinion by Justice Tomlinson in denying recovery states that the
meaning of "confined to" in the exclusion clause includes not only the damage
to the broken part but also all other damage to the car caused solely by the
mechanical defect, i.e., where the mechanical breakdown is the proximate
cause of such damage.
Insurance-Insurance Coverage Required of Municipal Corporation
Nashville Electric Service v. Luna, 204 S. W. 2d 529 (Tenn. 1947).
An electrical power wire which had been negligently exposed by an em-
ployee of the Electric Power Board of the City of Nashville resulted in the
death of the plaintiff's horse.
The court, per Justice Tomlinson, allowed recovery, holding that' this elec-
trical distribution system was operated in a proprietary rather than in a gov-
ernmental capacity; and that the provision in the special act (under which
the defendant operated) requiring insurance to be carried to protect against
"liability" which might arise in the operation of the system, included tort
liability.
Insurance-Effect of Parol Agreement
Travelers Insurance Campany v. Sides, 184 Tenn. 663, 202 S. W. 2d 815
(1947).
An insurance policy, providing for death and total permanent disability
benefits, contained a provision that double indemnity would be paid only it
accident causing death .occurred before any benefit or value, other than a
cash loan, was received. Upon total disability of insured, the plaintiff signed a
release and received and cashed a check for a lump sum payment in settlement
of the disability claim. After death of the insured ,the plaintiff brought an
action to collect double indemnity and attempted to introduce parol evidence
that when the release was signed, a contemporaneous agreement was entered
into providing that the double indemnity clause was to be inserted in the policy
when it was rewritten.
The opinion by Justice Prewitt states that the contemporaneous parol
agreement between the plaintiff and agent that double indemnity clause was to
be incorporated in the policy when rewritten was consistent with the tenor of
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the written release and was competent and admissible. Chief justice Chain-
bliss and Justice Neil dissented.
Limitation of Actions-Meaning of "Creditor" Under Claims Statute
Collins v. Ruffuer, 206 S. W. 2d 298 (Tenn. 1947).
Williams and Ruffner were both killed instantly in a collision of their
automobiles on May 5, 1946. On May 2, 1947, Mrs. Collins, administratrix of
the estate of Williams, sued the defendant, administrator of the estate of
Ruffner, for damages for the wrongful death of her intestate and for dam-
ages done to his automobile in the said collision. The defendant filed a plea in
abatement averring that the plaintiff failed to file her claim in the county court
as required by Chap. 175 of the°Acts of 1939 which provides in part that all
persons holding "claims" against the estate of the decedent must file their
claims with the clerk of the court in which the estate is being administered
within twelve (12) months from the date of notice to the creditors or the
claims shall be forever barred.
Speaking for the court, Justice Prewitt said that prior to the passage of
the Act of 1939, the court had held that a person who has a right of action in
tort against the personal representative of the deceased can not be deemed a
"creditor" of an estate until he obtains a judgment, and that the Act of 1939
affects procedure only and makes no change in substantive law as to who con-
stitutes creditors.
Pleading-Amendment of Declaration-to Include Necessary Party Plaintiff
Mosier v. Lucas, 207 S. W. 2d 1021 (Tenn. App. 1947), cert. denied.
Following the death of his son in an automobile accident, the plaintiff,
under survival statutes as next of kin, filed suit for damages for alleged
wrongful death. He failed to name as party plaintiff his wife, who, with the
plaintiff, constituted the sole next of kin. On motion for directed 'verdict the
plaintiff moved to amend but was overruled on the ground that the action of his
wife, a necessary party plaintiff, was barred by the statute of limitations.
Judge Hickerson delivered the opinion of the court and found that "Where
a suit is commenced to recover damages for a wrongful death by a proper and
necessary party before the suit is barred by the statute of limitations, an amend-
ment offered after the statute of limitations has barred the suit, which adds a
necessary party plaintiff, will relate back to the filing of the original summons
if the addition of the new party did not change the original cause of action,
nor introduce a neV cause of action."
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Real Property-Use of Technical Term in 'Deed by Layman
Carmody v. Trustees of Presbyterian Church, 203 S. W. 2d 176 (Tenn. App.
1947), cert. denied.
The validity of a deed was challenged on the ground that a clause which
stated "In other words the parties of the second part does not take title or pos-
session in and to the said real estate ... until after the death of the party of
the first part," makes the deed testamentary in character. [Italics added.]
Judge McAmis in his opinion upholding the validity of the deed concurs in
the finding and holding of the Chancellor that where the draftsman of an in-
strument is a layman, not a lawyer, and uses an isolated technical term, viz.,
title, the meaning of which is at complete variance with the plain and fully ex-
pressed intent of the grantor, it can and should be ignored.
Real Property-Equitable Assignment of a Future Interest
Hobson v. Hobson, 184 Tenn. 484, 201 S. W. 2d 659 (1947).
A will provided for division of land among children of the testator living
at the time of the death of a designated life tenant. Prior to the death of the life
tenant one son, a contingent remainderman, executed without warranties a deed
of trust in conveying what he thought was his vested interest in the land. Upon
the death of the life tenant, a judgment creditor of the aforesaid son sought
to have the title to the land cleared alleging that the executed deed of trust was
a nullity.
Justice Tomlinson delivered the opinion of the court and stated that the
will was subject to the "class doctrine" (Williams Code § 7598) and that no
title vested in the contin gent remainderman until the death of the life tenant;
but even so, and even though the conveyance contained no warranties, it was
not a nullity and equity -will cause the deed to be operative as an equitable as-
signment of a future interest.
Search and Seizure-Basis for Arrest Without Warrant
Thompson v. State, 203 S. V. 2d 361 (Tenm. 1947):
A state police officer received information by telephone that the defendant
would bring a load of whiskey from Kentucky into Henry County within the
next day or two. The officer immediately went to Henry County and swore out
a search warrant for the defendant. Shortly thereafter, the defendant drove/.
into Henry County where he was arrested and his car searched. On being prose-
cuted for the transportation of intoxicating liquors, the defendant attacked the
479.
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validity of the search warrant on the ground that it was obtained before he en-
tered the county.
The opinion. by Justice Prewitt points out that it is unnecessary to con-
sider the question of the validity of the search warrant as an officer can arrest
without a warrant any person he has reasonable cause to believe is committing a
felony and that a search made after such an arrest is lawful.
Torts-Liability of Municipality for Creation of Nuisance
Dixon v. City of Nashville, 203 S. W. 2d 178 (Tenn. App. 1946), cert. denied.
The city of Nashville, in improving a street, graded it in such a manner
that surface water was channeled through a single drain onto the plaintiff's
land, where formerly it was channeled through three drains. The accelerated
fiowage damaged the plaintiff's land.
An opinion by Judge McAmis states that this was a wrongful interference
with the natural drainage of surface water which caused injury to an adjoining
landowner and constituted an actionable nuisance; and although the defendant
is a municipality, it is liable if it creates a nuisance even in pursuing a public
work.
Tarts-Degree of Care Required of Bottler
Graham v. Cloar, 205 S. W. 2d 764 (Tenn. App. 1947), cert. denied.
As the plaintiff was placing some bottled beverage in a container, one of
the bottles exploded and a piece of glass caused the loss of sight in one eye.
At the trial of the suit Nvhich plaintiff brought against the bottler, the court
charged the jury that, a bottler was held to a high degree of care.
The opinion by Judge Baptist states that a bottler is held to a high degree
of care only for the protection of the health of the public; and that in a case
such as this, a bottler is required to use only that degree of care exercised by
an ordinary prudent person under the circumstances.
Torts-Remote Contributory Negligence and Jury Conduct
Sutherland v. Keene, 203 S. W. 2d 917 (Tenn. App. 1947), cert. denied.
The plaintiff and defendant had an automobile collision. The plaintiff re-
covered damages and the defendant appealed, citing as error, first, the submis-
sion to the jury of the problem of the plaintiff's admitted contributory negli-
gence; second, the fact that one juror was related to the plaintiff within the
sixth degree of kindred; and third, the failure on the part of the court to find
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the jury guilty of misconduct in discussing the probability of the defendant
carrying automobile liability insurance.
In an opinion by Judge McAmis the court held that where evidence is un-
disputed that plaintiff violated a traffic ordinance, it is still a question for the
jury as to whether his negligence was a proximate or remote cause of his in-
juries; that the juror was not conscious of his relationship to the plaintiff un-
til after verdict, and, there being no presumption of bias, the verdict can not
be annulled in the absence of a showing of injustice suffered by defendant; and
further, that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the jury's general dis-
cussion of insurance where, there was a showing that the jurors decided the
case on the law and the evidence presented.
Wills-Dissent from Agreement to Execute Companion Wills
Church of Christ Home for Aged, Inc., z,. Nashville Trust Co., 184 Tenn. 629,
202 S. W. 2d 178 (1947).
A husband and wife executed wills on th same day with the same sub-
scribing witnesses. Each testator provided that his or her property should be
held in trust by an executor, and upon the death of the survivor that the prop-
erty was to be divided equally between the complainant and another. After
the husband's death, on her petition, a court granted the wife an allowance for
a year's support. As this and the expenses of administration 'consumed the
entire estate of the husband, -the executor was thereafter discharged by the
court. Before the wife's death she prepared another will naming relatives as
devisees. Complainant brings this action for specific performance of the agree-
ment between the husband and wife.
The opinion by Justice Neil states that although the agreement between
the husband and wife deprived a survivor of the right to dissent, this did not
render such agreement unenforceable; but the court further held that the
trust was terminated when the court directed payment to the wife of the allow-
ance and discharged the executor. As the cause of action of the complainant ac-
crued at that time, relief was barred by the statute of limitations when this ac-
tion was brought.
Workmen's Compensation-When Does Claim Arise Under Act?
Pluinee v. Maryland Casualty Co., 184 Tenn. 497, 201 S. V. 2d 664 (1947).
As a result of a chemical explosion the complainant's eyes were irritated
and inflamed. He received treatment until he was apparently fully recovered.
Over a year later, because of trouble ,}ith one-eye, the complainant, again re-
ported for treatment and, after receiving treatment for some time, was, dyised
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that as a result of the injury by the fumes and gases, he had lost sight of one
eye. This bill was filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the de-
fendant demurred on grounds that the statute of limitations barred the action.
The opinion by Justice Gailor states that the one year statutory limitation
for the filing of a suit commences to run against a claimant, under the Work-
men's Compensation statute, from the occurrence of the injury and not from
the date of the accident.
Workmen's Compensation-Effect of Partial Loss of Member
Plumlee v. Maryland Casualty Co.. 184 Tenn. 497, 201 S. W. 2d 664 (1947).
An employee suffered severe leg burns' in the course of his employment.
and, though the leg was not lost, it apparently was rendered useless. Compen-
sation benefits were sought for total permanent disability.
The opinion by Justice Gailor stated that whereas loss of an entire mem-
ber is compensable by statutory amount for the loss of a member, if there is
partial loss, and evidence supports the employee's claim of total permanent
disability, the award will be based on actual impairment of earning capacity and
compensation benefits for total permanent disability may be allowed.
CASES OF CURRENT INTEREST AND IMPORTANCE
PREVIOUSLY NOTED
Baker v. State, 184 Tenn. 503 (1947), 1 Vand. L. Rev. 127 (1947). Accessory
after the fact-when is felony complete?
Black v. Black,.202 S. W. 2d 659 (Tenn. 1947), 20 Tenn. L. Rev. 201 (1948).
'Effect of reciting an oral contract to sell land in an undelivered deed.
Churn v. State, 184 Tenn. 646 (1947), 20 T~nn. L. Rev. 195 (1948). Testi-
mony of arresting officers.
Davisv. Beeler, 207 S. W. 2d 343 (Tenn. 1947), 1 Vand. L. Rev. 451 (1948).
Prohibition of practice of naturopathy in Tennessee.
Elliott v. Fuqua, 204 S. W. 2d 1016 (Tenn. 1947), 1 Vand. L. Rev. 309
(1948). Special legislation-population as basis for classification.
Hanm v. Harmn, 204 S. W. 2d 113 (Tenn. 1947), 1 Vand. L. Rev. 161 (1947).
Estoppel to challenge validity of void divorce decree. I
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Sepaugh v. Methodist Hospital, 202 S. W. 2d 985 (Tenn. App. 1947), 1
Vand. L. Rev. 153 (1947). Liability of charitable institution for negli-
gent acts of interne.
Smith v. Mitchell, 202 S. W. 2d 979 (Tenn. 1947), 1 Vand. L. Rev. 123
(1947). Jurisdiction to legitimate.
Tennessee Title Company v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 203 S. W.
2d 697 (Tenn. 1947), 1 Vand. L. Rev. 151 (1947). Substitution of
words by court in construing statute.
Thones v. Thones, 203.S. W. 2d 597 (Tenn. 1947), 1 Vand. L. Rev. 143
(1947). Contempt proceedings for enforcement of judgment based on
sister state alimony decree.
